She prefers words that approach the irreducible facticity of her beloved baseball statistics.
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The facticity of a photograph can conceal the craftiness of its content and selection.
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What mattered was how an individual life illuminated literature and vice versa, not the flotsam and facticity of someone's days.
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Mourning has historically inspired documentation for catharsis, but the advent of the camera granted a facticity to history that previous mediums could never offer.
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I think we have a naive notion about how much facticity and how much documentary evidence of things really exist, especially if they were really suppressed or oppressed.
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I'm not sure if this technology-derived algorithmic facticity of taste is better or worse than Meryl Streep-Anna Wintour deciding what I wear, which might be the core concern of this essay.
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As a site both revered as a religious sanctuary and routinely used as a meeting point for military operatives, shrouded in mystical folklore and implicated in international affairs, Kalimpong seems to serve as a foil for Dawood to explore the dimensions of facticity and fiction.
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Yet he also seemed to be operating on several overlapping assumptions: that an arbitrary exercise of power would make him look strong; that he would benefit from setting up the mainstream media, one of the most disliked institutions in the country, as a foil; that he could lie more effectively if he continued to assault the very notion of facticity; and, perhaps most important, that conflict boosts ratings.
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The origin of one's projection must still be one's facticity, though in the mode of not being it (essentially). An example of one focusing solely on possible projects without reflecting on one's current facticity: would be someone who continually thinks about future possibilities related to being rich (e.g. a better car, bigger house, better quality of life, etc.) without acknowledging the facticity of not currently having the financial means to do so. In this example, considering both facticity and transcendence, an authentic mode of being would be considering future projects that might improve one's current finances (e.g.
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As such, facticity is not something we come across and directly behold. In moods, for example, facticity has an enigmatic appearance, which involves both turning toward and away from it. For Heidegger, moods are conditions of thinking and willing to which they must in some way respond. The thrownness of human existence (or Dasein) is accordingly disclosed through moods.
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In philosophy, facticity (, ) has multiple meanings--from "factuality" and "contingency" to the intractable conditions of human existence.Sartre, Jean- Paul. Being and Nothingness.
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German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) discusses "facticity" as the "thrownness" (Geworfenheit) of individual existence, which is to say we are "thrown into the world." By this, he is not only referring to a brute fact, or the factuality of a concrete historical situation, e.g., "born in the '80s." Facticity is something that already informs and has been taken up in existence, even if it is unnoticed or left unattended.
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Facticity is defined by Sartre in Being and Nothingness (1943) as the in-itself, which delineates for humans the modalities of being and not being. This can be more easily understood when considering facticity in relation to the temporal dimension of our past: one's past is what one is, in that it co-constitutes oneself. However, to say that one is only one's past would ignore a significant part of reality (the present and the future), while saying that one's past is only what one was, would entirely detach it from oneself now. A denial of one's concrete past constitutes an inauthentic lifestyle, and also applies to other kinds of facticity (having a human body—e.g.
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A component of freedom is facticity, but not to the degree that this facticity determines one's transcendent choices (one could then blame one's background for making the choice one made [chosen project, from one's transcendence]). Facticity, in relation to authenticity, involves acting on one's actual values when making a choice (instead of, like Kierkegaard's Aesthete, "choosing" randomly), so that one takes responsibility for the act instead of choosing either-or without allowing the options to have different values.Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Existentialism", 2.3 Authenticity In contrast, the inauthentic is the denial to live in accordance with one's freedom. This can take many forms, from pretending choices are meaningless or random, convincing oneself that some form of determinism is true, or "mimicry" where one acts as "one should".
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Social facts can be material (i.e. physical objects) or immaterial (i.e. meanings, sentiments, etc.). Though the latter cannot be seen or touched, they are external and coercive, thus becoming real and gaining "facticity".
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"Ambiguity and Freedom," lays out the philosophical underpinnings of de Beauvoir's stance on ethics. She asserts that man is fundamentally free, a freedom that comes from his "nothingness," which is an essential aspect of his ability to be self-aware, to be conscious of himself: "... the nothingness which is at the heart of man is also the consciousness that he has of himself." But man is also a thing, a "facticity," an object for others. The ambiguity is that each of us is both subject and object, freedom and facticity.
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The phenomenological position is that although the facticity of the social world may be culturally and historically relative, the formal structures of consciousness, and the processes by which we come to know and understand this facticity, are not. That is, the understanding of any actual social world is unavoidably dependent on understanding the structures and processes of consciousness that found, and constitute, any possible social world. Alternatively, if the facticity of the social world and the structures of consciousness prove to be culturally and historically relative, then we are at an impasse in regard to any meaningful scientific understanding of the social world which is not subjective (as opposed to being objective and grounded in nature [positivism], or inter subjective and grounded in the structures of consciousness [phenomenology]), and relative to the cultural and idealization formations of particular concrete individuals living in a particular socio-historical group.
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In the mid-20th Century works of French existentialists Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, facticity signifies all of the concrete details against the background of which human freedom exists and is limited. For example, these may include the time and place of birth, a language, an environment, an individual's previous choices, as well as the inevitable prospect of their death. For example: currently, the situation of a person who is born without legs precludes their freedom to walk on the beach; if future medicine were to develop a method of growing new legs for that person, their facticity might no longer exclude this activity.
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Harald Holz, Transcendental philosophy and metaphysics, Mainz: Grünewald Press. Since 1964 he was Assistant Professor at the Institute of Philosophy at Ruhr University Bochum/Germany. In 1969 he published his Second Book with the university entitled Speculation and Facticity. On middle-aged and late Schelling's concept of freedom.
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Sartre continued a twentieth-century tradition of an incestuous flirtation between Électre and Oreste in Les Mouches. This flirtation may be understood as a display of Sartrean facticity, perhaps inspired by the incestuous siblings of Andre Gide’s Œdipe, and philosophically motivated by Gide and Sartre’s shared antipathy to Freud’s repression theory.
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Harald Holz, Speculation and Facticity. On middle-aged and late Schelling's concept of freedom, Bonn: Bouvier Press. Since 1971 he was Research Associate and Professor with Ruhr University Bochum. Since 1976 he was Chair Professor and Director of the Institute of Fundamental Philosophical-Theological Questions at the Westfalian Wilhelm University Münster/Germany.
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Secondness is a two-sided consciousness of effort and resistance engendered by being up against brute facts. Earthscore defines secondness as the "facticity", or "thisness", of something, as it exists, here and now, without rhyme or reason. Examples include: pushing against an unlocked door and meeting silent, unseen resistance. Thirdness mediates between secondness and firstness, between fact and possibility.
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According to Asif, "there is little reason for us to consider the facticity" of verses in the Baladhuri's version either, an account written to glorify the martial conquest of courtly Abbasid times and composed over 200 years after Qasim's death. The Chach Nama is a romantic work influenced by the 13th-century history, not a historical text of the 8th-century, states Asif.
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Luther would not have been able to rediscover original Christianity without metaphysics because, to put it hermeneutically, this would have passed over the historical facticity of the matter. Hermeneutic philosophy must incorporate theology because can do nothing else. The reverse also applies. The object of hermeneutics, the matter itself, is theological in such a way that it incorporates voices that the tradition that we are generates.
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The term is first used by German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) and has a variety of meanings. It can refer to facts and factuality, as in nineteenth-century positivism, but comes to mean that which resists explanation and interpretation in Wilhelm Dilthey and Neo-Kantianism. The Neo-Kantians contrasted facticity with ideality, as does Jürgen Habermas in Between Facts and Norms (Faktizität und Geltung).
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In order to have a true relational (covenant) connection there needs to be a true love relationship. A theological approach which depends entirely on historical facticity ignores the fact that the emphasis of the OT is on this relationship. Events occur and are remembered precisely because they depict elements of the relationship. Whatever approach is used, interpreters must describe as well as possible what their methodologies and presuppositions are for carrying out their work.
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The Sickness Unto Death has strong existentialist themes. For example, the concepts of the finite and infinite parts of the human self translate to Heidegger's concept of 'facticity' and Sartre's concept of 'transcendence' in Being and Nothingness. Kierkegaard's thesis is, of course, in other ways profoundly different from Sartre, most obviously because of Kierkegaard's belief that only religious faith can save the soul from despair. This particular brand of existentialism is often called Christian existentialism.
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In light of his fundamental ontology, Martin Heidegger interprets Aristotle in such a way that phronesis (and practical philosophy as such) is the original form of knowledge and thus primary to sophia (and theoretical philosophy).Günter Figal, Martin Heidegger zur Einführung, Hamburg 2003, p. 58. Heidegger interprets the Nicomachean Ethics as an ontology of Human Existence. The practical philosophy of Aristotle is a guiding thread in his Analysis of Existence according to which "facticity" names our unique mode of being-in-the-world.
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The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali also deal with Lightness. Book 3 describes Lightness or Laghima as being one of the eight siddhis, or eight perfections: the capacity to offset the force of one's facticity. This is defined in relation to Pullness or Garima, which concerns worldly weight and mass. Zen Buddhism teaches that one ought to become as light as being itself. Zen teaches one not only to find the lightness of being “bearable,” but to rejoice in this lightness.
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Moreover, his "color-space bodies" ("Farbraumkörper")Friedegund Weidemann, "Gotthard Graubner: Tojama II (Farbraumkörper), 1984", Verein der Freunde der Nationalgalerie. have been described by art historian Max Imdahl as "picture- objects" in which "color-space and body, intangible vision and tangible facticity cooperate in a special interrelationship."Cited by Sabine Schütz, "Color-Space Bodies: The Art of Gotthard Graubner", Arts Magazine, Volume 65, April 1991, p. 49. Graubner explains the genesis of his painting as an "intermediate" between Caspar David Friedrich and J.M.W. Turner.
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He is then filled with shame for he perceives himself as he would perceive someone else doing what he was doing - as a Peeping Tom. For Sartre, this phenomenological experience of shame establishes proof for the existence of other minds and defeats the problem of solipsism. For the conscious state of shame to be experienced, one has to become aware of oneself as an object of another look, proving a priori, that other minds exist. The Look is then co- constitutive of one's facticity.
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A critical claim in existentialist thought is that individuals are always free to make choices and guide their lives towards their own chosen goal or "project". This claim suggests that individuals cannot escape this freedom, even in overwhelming circumstances. For instance, even an empire's colonized victims possess choices: to submit to rule, to negotiate, to commit suicide, to resist nonviolently, or to counter- attack. Although external circumstances may limit individuals (this limitation from the outside is called facticity), they cannot force a person to follow one of the remaining courses over another.
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Humans are always aware that they are more than what they are aware of, meaning that they are not whatever they are aware of. In this sense, humans cannot be defined as "intentional objects" of consciousness that includes the restrictions imposed by facticity, personal history, character, bodies, or objective responsibility. Thus, as Sartre often repeated, "Human reality is what it is not, and it is not what it is." An example of what he means is being a doctor but wishing to "transcend" that to become a pig farmer.
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In this sense the individual still has some freedom of choice. For this reason, an individual may choose in anguish, fully aware that this will have consequences. For Sartre, to claim that one amongst many conscious possibilities takes undeniable precedence (for instance, "I cannot risk my life, because I must support my family") is to assume the role of an object in the world, not a free agent, but merely at the mercy of circumstance (a being-in-itself that is only its own facticity, i.e., it "is" inside itself, and acts there as a limitation).
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Looking at five separate "elements" of objectivity—detachment, nonpartisanship, inverted pyramid writing, facticity, and balance—Mindich pinpointed specific historical moments when newswriting advanced toward its present form. One notable chapter is chapter three, which revealed that it was the government, and not journalists, who were using the inverted pyramid during the American Civil War. Another is chapter five, which is about the practice of lynching. Here Mindich argues that despite its claim of balance, The New York Times couldn't get the lynching story right because of the cultural (and racist) baggage its reporters and sources were bringing to the table.
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As an example, consider two men, one of whom has no memory of his past and the other who remembers everything. Both have committed many crimes, but the first man, remembering nothing, leads a rather normal life while the second man, feeling trapped by his own past, continues a life of crime, blaming his own past for "trapping" him in this life. There is nothing essential about his committing crimes, but he ascribes this meaning to his past. However, to disregard one's facticity during the continual process of self-making, projecting oneself into the future, would be to put oneself in denial of oneself and would be inauthentic.
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Having concluded that the "production of papers" for publication in a scientific journal is the primary focus of a laboratory, the observer next aims to "consider papers as objects in much the same way as manufactured goods" (71). This involves asking how papers are produced, what their constituent elements (or raw materials) are, and why these papers are so important. First, the authors recognize that in papers, "some statements appeared more fact-like than others" (76). From this observation, a five- element continuum of facticity is constructed, which spans from type 5 statements which are taken for granted to type 1 statements which are unqualified speculations, with various intermediate levels in between.
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Whereas rationality was the key to completing Hegel's philosophical system, Schelling could not accept the absolutism prioritzed to Reason. Bowie elaborates on this: > Hegel's system tries to obviate the facticity of the world by understanding > reason as the world's immanent self-articulation. Schelling, in contrast, > insists that human reason cannot explain its own existence, and therefore > cannot encompass itself and its other within a system of philosophy. We > cannot, [Schelling] maintains, make sense of the manifest world by beginning > with reason, but must instead begin with the contingency of being and try to > make sense of it with the reason which is only one aspect of it and which > cannot be explained in terms of its being a representation of the true > nature of being.
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At this premiere, Cullum's 25-minute speech at the end of the play was described by Mel Gussow in The New York Times as "a Wagnerian intensity without resorting to histrionics" that "almost succeeds in that most difficult of tasks—humanizing Hitler". In World Literature Today, Bettina L. Knapp wrote that the play presented theatre-goers with the dilemma: what would you do with Hitler were he to surface today? Skloot noted that while the "facts" in Steiner's work are pure fiction, the play confronts the audience with an event that cannot be resolved with traditional "logic, facticity and morality". Responding to theatre critics who objected to Hitler having the last word, Steiner said he wanted the audience to refute the former dictator's claims themselves.
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The conclusion reached is that statements in a laboratory routinely travel up and down this continuum, and the main purpose of a laboratory is to take statements of one level of facticity and transform them to another level. However, Latour and Woolgar recognize that this semi-fictionalized account of an ignorant observer aiming to systematize the alien laboratory has several problems. While the observer's rich descriptions of activity in the lab are taken as accurate, the observer has not established that the interpretation of this data in terms of literary inscription is exhaustive or the only way in which laboratory life can be analyzed. In the authors' words, the observer's account is not "immune from all possibility of future qualification" (88).
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In the previous section, Latour and Woolgar used a semi- fictional observer to describe the laboratory as a literary system in which mere statements are turned into facts and vice versa. The most sound and established facts were those statements which could be divorced from their contingent circumstances. The authors next aim to interrogate how this process operates on a very small and specific scale by looking at how this process operated with respect to the molecule TRF(H), whose molecular structure went through various stages of facticity both in and out of the laboratory Latour studied. In this section, Latour and Woolgar aim to "specify the precise time and place in the process of fact construction when a statement became transformed into a fact and hence freed from the circumstances of its production" (105).
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The facticity of this world of common sense is both unquestioned and virtually "unquestionable;" it is sanctionable as to its status as that which "is," and that which "everyone," or, at least, "any reasonable person," agrees to be the case with regard to the factual character of the world. As far as traditional social science is concerned, this taken-for-granted world of social facts is the starting and end point for any and all investigations of the social world. It provides the raw, observable, taken-for-granted "data" upon which the findings of the social sciences are idealized, conceptualized, and offered up for analysis and discourse. Within traditional social science, this "data" is formulated into a second order world of abstractions and idealizations constituted in accordance with these sciences' pre-determined interpretive schemes.
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In a 1988 study, Jungian analyst Laurie Layton Schapira explored what she called the "Cassandra complex" in the lives of two of her analysands. Based on clinical experience, she delineates three factors constituting the Cassandra complex: # dysfunctional relationships with the "Apollo archetype", # emotional or physical suffering, including hysteria (conversion disorder) or "women’s problems", and # being disbelieved when attempting to relate the facticity of these experiences to others. Layton Schapira views the Cassandra complex as resulting from a dysfunctional relationship with what she calls the "Apollo archetype", an archetype referring to any individual's or culture's pattern that is dedicated to, yet bound by, order, reason, intellect, truth, and clarity that disavows itself of anything occult or irrational.Laurie Layton Schapira, The Cassandra Complex: Living With Disbelief: A Modern Perspective on Hysteria p.
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Butler questions the notion that "the body" itself is a natural entity that "admits no genealogy", a usual given without explanation: "How are the contours of the body clearly marked as the taken- for-granted ground or surface upon which gender signification are inscribed, a mere facticity devoid of value, prior to significance?" (129). Building on the thinking of the anthropologist Mary Douglas, outlined in her Purity and Danger (1966), Butler claims that the boundaries of the body have been drawn to instate certain taboos about limits and possibilities of exchange. Thus the hegemonic and homophobic press has read the pollution of the body that AIDS brings about as corresponding to the pollution of the homosexual's sexual activity, in particular his crossing the forbidden bodily boundary of the perineum.
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